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Abstract
A linear restriction of a function is the same function with its domain restricted to
points on a given line. This paper addresses the problem of computing a succinct
representation for a linear restriction of a piecewise-linear neural network. This
primitive, which we call EXACTLINE, allows us to exactly characterize the result
of applying the network to all of the infinitely many points on a line. In particular,
EXACTLINE computes a partitioning of the given input line segment such that the
network is affine on each partition. We present an efficient algorithm for computing
EXACTLINE for networks that use ReLU, MaxPool, batch normalization, fully-
connected, convolutional, and other layers, along with several applications. First,
we show how to exactly determine decision boundaries of an ACAS Xu neural net-
work, providing significantly improved confidence in the results compared to prior
work that sampled finitely many points in the input space. Next, we demonstrate
how to exactly compute integrated gradients, which are commonly used for neural
network attributions, allowing us to show that the prior heuristic-based methods
had relative errors of 25-45% and show that a better sampling method can achieve
higher accuracy with less computation. Finally, we use EXACTLINE to empirically
falsify the core assumption behind a well-known hypothesis about adversarial
examples, and in the process identify interesting properties of adversarially-trained
networks.
1 Introduction
The past decade has seen the rise of deep neural networks (DNNs) [1] to solve a variety of problems,
including image recognition [2, 3], natural-language processing [4], and autonomous vehicle con-
trol [5]. However, such models are difficult to meaningfully interpret and check for correctness. Thus,
researchers have tried to understand the behavior of such networks. For instance, networks have
been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial examples—inputs changed in a way imperceptible to
humans but resulting in a misclassification by the network [6–9]–and fooling examples—inputs that
are completely unrecognizable by humans but classified with high confidence by DNNs [10]. The
presence of such adversarial and fooling inputs as well as applications in safety-critical systems has
led to efforts to verify and certify DNNs [11–19]. Orthogonal approaches help visualize the behavior
of the network [20–22] and interpret its decisions [23–27]. Despite the tremendous progress, more
needs to be done to help understand DNNs and increase their adoption [28–31].
In this paper, we present algorithms for computing the EXACTLINE primitive: given a piecewise-
linear neural network (e.g. composed of convolutional and ReLU layers) and line in the input space
QR, we partition QR such that the network is affine on each partition. Thus, EXACTLINE precisely
captures the behavior of the network for the infinite set of points lying on the line between two points.
In effect, EXACTLINE computes a succinct representation for a linear restriction of a piecewise-linear
neural network; a linear restriction of a function is the same function with its domain restricted to
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points on a given line. We present an efficient implementation of EXACTLINE (Section 2) for neural
networks that use sequential combinations of affine (including fully-connected, convolutional, and
batch normalization), ReLU, and MaxPool layers, as well as examples of how EXACTLINE can be
used to understand the behavior of DNNs.
Section 3 demonstrates the natural use case of EXACTLINE to characterize the input-output behavior
of a DNN. Specifically, we consider a problem posed by Wang et al. [32], viz., to determine
the classification regions of ACAS Xu [5], an aircraft collision avoidance network, when linearly
interpolating between two input situations. This characterization can, for instance, determine at
which precise distance from the ownship a nearby plane causes the ACAS Xu network to instruct the
ownship to make a hard change in direction.
Section 4 describes how EXACTLINE can be used to exactly compute the integrated gradients [25], a
state-of-the-art network attribution method that until now has only been approximated. We use this to
quantify the error of previous heuristics-based methods, and find that they result in attributions with a
relative error of 25-45%. Finally, we show that a different heuristic method using trapezoidal rule can
lead to significantly higher accuracy with fewer samples.
Section 5 uses EXACTLINE to probe interesting properties of the neighborhoods around test images.
We investigate and reject a fundamental assumption behind the “Linear Explanation of Adversarial
Examples” [7] for a number of test networks. Finally, we note interesting results that show DiffAI-
protected [33] neural networks exhibit significantly less non-linearity in practice, which perhaps
contributes to their adversarial robustness.
We have made our source code available at https://github.com/95616ARG/SyReNN in the form of
a C++ server and Python client library for computing EXACTLINE, along with Python scripts for
running all of the experiments described in this paper.
2 The EXACTLINE Primitive
Given a piecewise-linear neural network f and two points Q,R in the input space of f , we consider
the restriction of f to QR, denoted f QR, which is identical to the function f except that its input
domain has been restricted to QR. We now want to find a succinct representation for f QR that we
can analyze more readily than the neural network corresponding to f . In this paper, we propose to use
the EXACTLINE representation, which corresponds to a linear partitioning of f QR, defined below.
Definition 1. Given a function f : A→ B and line segment QR ⊆ A, a tuple (P1, P2, P3, . . . , Pn)
is a linear partitioning of f QR, denoted P
(
f QR
)
and referred to as “EXACTLINE of f over QR,”
if:
1. {PiPi+1 | 1 ≤ i < n} partitions QR (except for overlap at endpoints).
2. P1 = Q and Pn = R.
3. For all 1 ≤ i < n, there exists an affine map Ai such that f(x) = Ai(x) for all x ∈ PiPi+1.
In other words, we wish to partitionQR into a set of pieces where the action of f on all points in each
piece is affine. The smallest tuple satisfying the requirements on P(f QR) is unique (when it exists)
for any given f and QR, and any tuple satisfying P(f QR) can be converted to this minimal tuple by
removing any endpoint Pi which lies on Pi−1Pi+1. In the proceeding text we will discuss methods
for computing some tuple satisfying P(f QR); if the reader desires, they can use the procedure
mentioned in the previous sentence to reduce this to the unique smallest such tuple. However, we note
that the algorithms below usually produce the minimal tuple on real-world networks even without
any reduction procedure due to the high dimensionality of the functions involved.
Given the partition endpoints P(f QR) = (P1, . . . , Pn), the corresponding affine function for
each partition PiPi+1 can be determined by recognizing that affine maps preserve ratios along
lines. In other words, given point x = (1 − α)Pi + αPi+1 on linear partition PiPi+1, we have
f(x) = (1 − α)f(Pi) + αf(Pi+1). In this way, P
(
f QR
)
provides us a succinct and precise
representation for the behavior of f on all points along QR.
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Figure 1: Computing the linear restriction of f (Equation 1) using EXACTLINE. The input line
segment QR is divided into three linear partitions such that the transformation from input space to
output space (left plot to right plot) is affine (Equation 2). Tick marks (on the left) are used in figures
throughout this paper to indicate the partition endpoints (P1, P2, . . . , Pn).
Consider an illustrative neural network that takes as input the age and income of an individual and
produces as output the loan-approval score and the premium that should be charged over a baseline
amount:
f(X = (x0, x1)) = ReLU (A(X)) , where A(X) =
[−1.7 1.0
2.0 −1.3
]
X +
[
3
3
]
(1)
Suppose an individual of 20 years old making $30k/year (Q = (20, 30)) predicts that their earnings
will increase linearly every year until they reach 30 years old and are making $50k/year (R =
(30, 50)). We wish to understand how they will be classified by this system over these 10 years.
We can use EXACTLINE (Definition 1) to compute P(f QR) = (P1 = Q,P2 = (23.3, 36.6),
P3 = (26.6, 43.3), P4 = R), where f QR is exactly described by the following piecewise-linear
function (Figure 1):
f QR(x) =

[
0 0
2 −1.3
]
x+
[
0
3
]
, x ∈ QP2[
−1.7 1
2 −1.3
]
x+
[
3
3
]
, x ∈ P2P3[
−1.7 1
0 0
]
x+
[
3
0
]
, x ∈ P3R
(2)
Other Network Analysis Techniques Compared to prior work, our solution to EXACTLINE
presents an interesting and unique design point in the space of neural-network analysis. Approaches
such as [12, 34, 16] are precise, but exponential time because they work over the entire input domain.
On another side of the design space, approaches such as those used in [15, 34, 35, 17, 36, 32] are
significantly faster while still working over the full-dimensional input space, but accomplish this
by trading analysis precision for speed. This trade-off between speed and precision is particularly
well-illuminated by [37], which monotonically refines its analysis when given more time. In contrast,
the key observation underlying our work is that we can perform both an efficient (worst-case polyno-
mial time for a fixed number of layers) and precise analysis by restricting the input domain to be one
dimensional (a line). This insight opens a new dimension to the discussion of network analysis tools,
showing that dimensionality can be traded for significant gains in both precision and efficiency (as
opposed to prior work which has explored the tradeoff primarily along the precision and efficiency
axes under the assumption of high-dimensional input regions).
Algorithm We assume the network f = Ll ◦ Ll−1 ◦ . . . L1 is a sequential concatenation of
piecewise-linear layers and desire to compute P(f QR). Because affine layers (eg. fully-connected
and convolutional layers) map lines to lines, EXACTLINE for affine layers does not introduce any
new linear partitions. This is captured by Theorem 1 (proved in Appendix B) below:
Theorem 1. For any affine function A : X → Y and line segment QR ⊂ X , the following is a
suitable linear partitioning (Definition 1):
P(AQR) = (Q,R)
3
The following theorem (proved in Appendix C) presents a method of computing P(ReLUQR).
Theorem 2. Given a line segment QR in d dimensions and a rectified linear layer ReLU(x) =
(max(x1, 0), . . . ,max(xd, 0)), the following is a suitable linear partitioning (Definition 1):
P(ReLUQR) = sorted (({Q,R} ∪ {Q+ α(R−Q) | α ∈ D}) ∩QR) , (3)
where D = {−Qi/(Ri −Qi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ d}, Vi is the ith component of vector V , and sorted returns
a tuple of the points sorted by distance from Q.
The essential insight is that we can “follow” the line until an orthant boundary is reached, at which
point a new linear region begins. To that end, each ratio in D represents a “crossing ratio”, i.e. a
ratio between Q and R at which QR crosses an orthant boundary. Notably, D actually computes
such “crossing ratios” for the unbounded line QR, which is why we need to intersect the generated
endpoints with QR in Equation 3.
An analogous algorithm for MaxPool is presented in Appendix D; the intuition is to follow the line
until the maximum in any window changes. When a ReLU layer is followed by a MaxPool layer (or
vice-versa), extraneous regions may be added (eg. the ReLU layer may add endpoints for coordinates
that are not the maximum in any window, and thus do not affect the final output). The optimization
described in Appendix E can be used in this scenario.
More generally, as long as the function’s input domain can be decomposed into finitely-many convex
(not-necessarily-bounded) polytopes where the function is affine within each polytope, the general
algorithm described in Appendix F suffices to compute EXACTLINE for the function.
Finally, we note that in practice we want to compute P(f QR) for entire neural networks (i.e.
sequential compositions of layers), not just individual layers (as we have demonstrated above). To
that end, the next theorem shows that, as long as one can compute P(LiMN) for each individual
layer Li over an arbitrary line segment MN , then P
(
f QR
)
can be computed, effectively allowing
us to compose EXACTLINE algorithms.
Theorem 3. Given any piecewise-linear functions f, g, h such that f = h ◦ g along with a line
segment QR where g(R) 6= g(Q) and P(gQR) = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) is EXACTLINE applied to g
over QR, the following holds:
P(f QR) = sorted
(
n−1⋃
i=1
{
Pi +
y − g(Pi)
g(Pi+1)− g(Pi) × (Pi+1 − Pi) | y ∈ P
(
hg(Pi)g(Pi+1)
)})
where sorted returns a tuple of the points sorted by distance from Q.
The key insight is that we can first compute EXACTLINE for the first layer, i.e. P(L1QR) =
(P 11 , P
1
2 , . . . , P
1
n), then we can continue computing EXACTLINE for the rest of the network within
each of the partitions P 1i P
1
i+1 individually.
We note that the algorithm corresponding to Theorem 1 runs on a single line segment in constant
time producing a single resulting line segment. The algorithm corresponding to Equation 3 runs on
a single line segment in O(d) time, producing at most O(d) new segments. If w is the number of
windows and s is the size of each window, the algorithms for MaxPool and ReLU + MaxPool run
in time O(ws2) and produce O(ws) new line segments. Thus, using the algorithm corresponding
to Theorem 3, over arbitrarily many affine layers, l ReLU layers each with d units, and m MaxPool or
MaxPool + ReLU layers with w windows each of size s, then at most O((d+ws)l+m) segments may
be produced. If only l ReLU and arbitrarily-many affine layers are used, at most O(dl) segments may
be produced; a significant improvement over the O((2d)l) upper-bound and Ω(l · (2d)) lower-bound
time of Xiang et al. [34].
One major reason for our improvement is that we particularly consider one-dimensional input lines
as opposed to arbitrary polytopes. Lines represent a particularly efficient special case as they are
efficiently representable (by their endpoints) and, being one-dimensional, are not subject to the
combinatorial blow-up faced by transforming larger input regions. Furthermore, in practice, we have
found that the majority of ReLU nodes are “stable”, and the actual number of segments remains
tractable; this algorithm for EXACTLINE often executes in a matter of seconds for networks with
over 60, 000 units (whereas the algorithm of Xiang et al. [34] runs in at least exponential O(l · (2d))
time regardless of the input region as it relies on trivially considering all possible orthants).
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3 Characterizing Decision Boundaries for ACAS Xu
The first application of EXACTLINE we consider is that of understanding the decision boundaries of a
neural network over some infinite set of inputs. As a motivating example, we consider the ACAS Xu
network trained by Julian et al. [5] to determine what action an aircraft (the “ownship”) should take in
order to avoid a collision with an intruder. After training such a network, one usually wishes to probe
and visualize the recommendations of the network. This is desirable, for example, to determine at
what distance from the ownship an intruder causes the system to suggest a strong change in heading,
or to ensure that distance is roughly the same regardless of which side the intruder approaches.
The simplest approach, shown in Figure 2f and currently the standard in prior work, is to consider
a (finite) set of possible input situations (samples) and see how the network reacts to each of them.
This can help one get an overall idea of how the network behaves. For example, in Figure 2f, we can
see that the network has a mostly symmetric output, usually advising the plane to turn away from the
intruder when sufficiently close.
Although sampling in this way gives human viewers an intuitive and meaningful way of understanding
the network’s behavior, it is severely limited because it relies on sampling finitely many points from a
(practically) infinite input space. Thus, there is a significant chance that some interesting or dangerous
behavior of the network may be exposed with more samples.
By contrast, the EXACTLINE primitive can be used to exactly determine the output of the network at
all of the infinitely many points on a line in the input region. For example, in Figure 2a, we have used
EXACTLINE to visualize a particular head-on collision scenario where we vary the distance of the
intruder (specified in polar coordinates (ρ, θ)) with respect to the ownship (always at (0, 0)). Notably,
there is a region of “Strong Left” in a region of the line that is otherwise entirely “Weak Left“ that
shows up in Figure 2a (the EXACTLINE method) but not in Figure 2b (the sampling method). We
can do this for lines varying the θ parameter instead of ρ, result in Figure 2c and Figure 2d. Finally,
repeating this process for many lines and overlapping them on the same graph produces a detailed
“grid” as shown in Figure 2e.
Figure 2e also shows a number of interesting and potentially dangerous behaviors. For example, there
is a significant region behind the plane where an intruder on the left may cause the ownship to make
a weak left turn towards the intruder, an unexpected and asymmetric behavior. Furthermore, there are
clear regions of strong left/right where the network otherwise advises weak left/right. Meanwhile,
in Figure 2f, we see that the sampling density used is too low to notice the majority of this behavior.
In practice, it is not clear what sampling density should be taken to ensure all potentially-dangerous
behaviors are caught. For safety-critical systems such as aircraft collision avoidance, this uncertainty
is unacceptable.
Takeaways Understanding neural network decision boundaries based on finite sampling of the
infinite input space result in low-confidence results, as undesirable behavior may be occurring at
scales smaller than that of one’s sampling density. EXACTLINE can be used to visualize the network’s
output on infinite subsets of the input space, significantly improving the confidence one can have in
the resulting visualization and in the safety and accuracy of the model being visualized.
Future Work One particular area of future work in this direction is using EXACTLINE to assist in
network verification tools such as Katz et al. [12] and Gehr et al. [15]. For example, the relatively-fast
EXACTLINE could be used to check infinite subsets of the input space for counter-examples (which
can then be returned immediately) before calling the more-expensive complete verification tools.
4 Exact Computation of Integrated Gradients
Integrated Gradients (IG) [25] is a method of attributing the prediction of a DNN to its input features.
Suppose function F : Rn → [0, 1] defines the network. The integrated gradient along the ith
dimension for an input x = (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn and baseline x′ ∈ Rn is defined as:
IGi(x)
def
= (xi − x′i)×
∫ 1
α=0
∂F (x′ + α× (x− x′))
∂xi
dα (4)
Thus, the integrated gradient along all input dimensions is the integral of the gradient computed on all
points on the straightline path from the baseline x′ to the input x. In prior work it was not known how
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(f) Sampling finitely many points
Figure 2: (a)–(d) Understanding the decision boundary of an ACAS Xu aircraft avoidance network
along individual lines using EXACTLINE ((a), (c)) and finite sampling ((b), (d)). In the EXACTLINE
visualizations there is a clear region of “strong left” in a region that is otherwise “weak left” that
does not show in the sampling plots due to the sampling density chosen. In practice, it is not clear
what sampling density to choose, thus the resulting plots can be inaccurate and/or misleading. (e)–(f)
Computing the decision boundaries among multiple lines and plotting on the same graph. Using
EXACTLINE to sample infinitely many points provides more confidence in the interpretation of the
decision boundaries. Compare to similar figures in Julian et al. [5], Katz et al. [12].
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Figure 3: “Integrated Gradients” is a powerful method of neural network attribution. IG relies on
computing the integral of the gradients of the network at all points linearly interpolated between two
images (as shown above), however previous work has only been able to approximate the true IG,
casting uncertainty on the results. Within each partition identified by EXACTLINE (delineated by
vertical lines) the gradient is constant, so computing the exact IG is possible for the first time.
to exactly compute this integral for complex networks, so it was approximated using the left-Riemann
summation of the gradients at m uniformly sampled points along the straightline path from x′ to x:
I˜G
m
i
def
= (xi − x′i)×
∑
0≤k<m
∂F (x′ + k
m
× (x− x′))
∂xi
× 1
m
(5)
The number of samples m determines the quality of this approximation. Let m˜ denote the number of
samples that is large enough to ensure that
∑n
i=1 I˜G
m˜
i ≈ F (x)− F (x′). This is the recommended
number of samples suggested by Sundararajan et al. [25]. In practice, m˜ can range between 20 and
1000 [25, 38].
While the (exact) IG described by Equation 4 satisfies properties such as completeness [25, §3] and
sensitivity [25, §2.1], the approximation computed in practice using Equation 5 need not.
The integral in Equation 4 can be computed exactly by adding an additional condition to the definiton
of EXACTLINE: that the gradient of the network within each partition is constant. It turns out that this
stricter definition is met by all of the algorithms we have discussed so far, a fact we discuss in more
detail in Appendix H. For ReLU layers, for example, because the network acts like a single affine
map within each orthant, and we split the line such that each partition is entirely contained within
an orthant, the network’s gradient is constant within each orthant (and thus along each EXACTLINE
partition). This is stated formally by Theorem 4 and proved in Appendix H:
Theorem 4. For any network f with nonlinearities introduced only by ReLU functions and
P(f QR) = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) computed according to Equation 3, the gradient of f with respect to
its input vector x, i.e. ∇f(x), is constant within each linear partition PiPi+1.
This allows us to exactly compute the IG of each individual partition r (RIGri ) by finding the gradient
at any point in that partition and multiplying by the width of the partition:
RIGri (x)
def
= (P(r+1)i − Pri)×
∂F (0.5× (Pri + P(r+1)i))
∂xi
(6)
Compared to Equation 4, Equation 6 computes the IG for partition for PrPr+1 by replacing the
integral with a single term (arbitrarily choosing α = 0.5, i.e. the midpoint) because the gradient is
uniform along PrPr+1. The exact IG of x′x is the sum of the IGs of each partition:
IGi(x) =
n∑
r=1
RIGri (x) (7)
Empirical Results A prime interest of ours was to determine the accuracy of the existing sampling
method. On three different CIFAR10 networks [39], we took each image in the test set and computed
the exact IG against a black baseline using Equation 7. We then found m˜ and computed the mean
relative error between the exact IG and the approximate one. As shown in Table 1, the approximate
IG has an error of 25 − 45%. This is a concerning result, indicating that the existing use of IG in
practice may be misleading. Notably, without EXACTLINE, there would be no way of realizing this
issue, as this analysis relies on computing the exact IG to compare with.
For many smaller networks considered, we have found that computing the exact IG is relatively
fast (i.e., at most a few seconds) and would recommend doing so for situations where it is feasible.
However, in some cases the number of gradients that would have to be taken to compute exact IG is
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high (see Column 2, Table 2). In such cases, we can use our exact computation to understand how
many uniform samples one should use to compute the approximate IG to within 5% of the exact IG.
To that end, we performed a second experiment by increasing the number of samples taken until
the approximate IG reached within 5% error of the exact integrated gradients. In practice, we found
there were a number of “lucky guess” situations where taking, for example, exactly 5 samples led to
very high accuracy, but taking 4 or 6 resulted in very poor accuracy. To minimize the impact of such
outliers, we also require that the result is within 5% relative error when taking up to 5 more samples.
In Table 2 the results of this experiment are shown under the column “left,” where it becomes clear
that relatively few samples (compared to the number of actual linear regions under “exact”) are
actually needed.
Thus, one concrete suggestion for using integrated gradients would be to use our tool at training time
on a test set to understand how many samples are needed on average to get within a desired accuracy,
then use that many samples when approximating IG instead of the existing heuristic (which we found
earlier to be misleading).
Finally, the left Riemann sum used by existing work in integrated gradients [25] is only one of
many possible sampling methods; one could also use a right Riemann sum or the “Trapezoidal
Rule.” Without a way to compute the actual integrated gradient to compare to, no prior work has
considered using such alternatives. With EXACTLINE we can compute the exact IG and quantify
how much better or worse each approximation method is. To that end, the columns “right” and “trap.”
in Table 2 show the number of samples one must take to get consistently within 5% of the exact
integrated gradients. Our results show the number of samples needed to accurately approximate IG
with trapezoidal rule is significantly less than using left and right sums. Note that, because these
networks are piecewise-linear functions, it is possible for trapezoidal sampling to be worse than left
or right sampling, and in fact for all tested models there were images where trapezoidal sampling was
less accurate than left and right sampling. This is why having the ability to compute the exact IG is
important, to ensure that we can empirically quantify the error involved in and justify choices between
different heuristics. Furthermore, we find a per-image reduction in the number of samples needed of
20− 40% on average. Thus, we also recommend that users of IG use a trapezoidal approximation
instead of the currently-standard left sum.
Takeaways EXACTLINE is the first method for exactly computing integrated gradients, as all other
uses of the technique have sampled according to Equation 5. From our results, we provide two
suggestions to practicioners looking to use IG: (1) Use EXACTLINE on a test set before deployment
to better understand how the number of samples taken relates to approximation error, then choose
sampling densities at runtime based on those statistics and the desired accuracy; (2) Use the trapezoidal
Table 1: Mean relative error of
approximate IG using m˜ (previ-
ous recommendation) samples on
CIFAR10 networks. The approxi-
mation error is surprisingly high,
especially for the largest model.
This type of analysis would not
be possible without the ability
to exactly compute the IG with
EXACTLINE.
Error (%)
convsmall 24.95
convmedium 24.05
convbig 45.34
Table 2: Average number of samples needed by different
approximate IG techniques to get within 5% of the exact IG
on CIFAR10 networks. A small number of outliers required
more than 1, 000 samples to reach 5%, which we have re-
moved from the summary statistics. The current standard
for computing integrated gradients is the left-Riemann sum,
however these results show that trapezoidal approximations
tend to be significantly more accurate when computing the
IG. This suggests a simple modification to IG approximations
that can cause large gains in accuracy and/or performance.
Here again, without EXACTLINE, it would not be possible
to quantify the approximation error and thus empirically
compare such approximation techniques.
Exact Approximate
left right trap.
convsmall 2582.74 136.74 139.40 91.67
convmedium 3578.89 150.31 147.59 91.57
convbig 14064.65 269.43 278.20 222.79
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Bird
Training Method: Normal
Direction: FGSM +3%
Density: 212.60
Label: Cat
Training Method: Normal
Direction: Random +3%
Density: 129.46
Label: Bird
Figure 4: Comparing the density of linear partitions from a test image to FGSM and random
baselines. The long blue line segment indicates the change in classification. (1) Even within a small
perturbation of the input point, there is significant non-linear behavior in the network. (2) Although
the linear hypothesis for adversarial examples predicts that both normal inputs and their corresponding
adversarial examples (“FGSM + 3%”) will lie on the same linear region, we find in practice that,
not only do they lie on different linear regions, but there is significantly more non-linearity in the
adversarial (FGSM) direction than a random direction. This falsifies the fundamental assumption
behind the linear explanation of adversarial examples.
Bird
Training Method: Normal
Direction: Random +3%
Density: 129.46
Label: Bird
Training Method: DiffAI
Direction: Random +3%
Density: 37.87
Label: Bird
Figure 5: Comparing the density of linear partitions from a test image to random baselines for normal
(in black) and DiffAI-protected networks (in green). Networks trained with the DiffAI robust-training
scheme tend to exhibit significantly fewer non-linearities than their normally-trained counterparts.
rule approximation instead of the standard left-sum when approximating to get better accuracy with
fewer samples.
Future Work Future work may investigate the use of EXACTLINE in designing and evaluating
new non-uniform sampling and approximation techniques for Integrated Gradients. EXACTLINE
can similarly be used to exactly compute other measures involving path integrals such as neuron
conductance [40], a refinement of integrated gradients.
5 Linearly Probing Point Neighborhoods
In this section, we demonstrate the use of EXACTLINE in an open-ended investigation of a well-
known hypothesis for the existence of adversarial examples. We use EXACTLINE to empirically
investigate and falsify a fundamental assumption behind the hypothesis. In the process, using
EXACTLINE, we discover a strong association between robustness and the empirical linearity of a
network, which we believe may help spur future work in understanding the source of adversarial
examples.
Empirically Testing the Linear Explanation of Adversarial Examples We consider in this sec-
tion one of the dominant hypotheses for the problem of adversarial examples ([6–8]), first proposed
by Goodfellow et al. [7] and termed the “Linear Explanation of Adversarial Examples.” It makes
a fundamental assumption that, when restricted to the region around a particular input point, the
output of the neural network network is linear, i.e. the tangent plane to the network’s output at that
point exactly matches the network’s true output. Starting from this assumption, Goodfellow et al. [7]
makes a theoretical argument concluding that the phenomenon of adversarial examples results from
the network being “too linear.”
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Table 3: Density of FGSM line partitions divided by density of Random line partitions. FGSM
directions tend to be significantly more non-linear (more dense) than random directions, contradicting
the fundamental assumption behind the well-known Linear Explanation of Adversarial Examples.
Mdn: Median, 25%: 25% percentile, 75%: 75% percentile
(a) MNIST
FGSM/Random
Training Method Mdn 25% 75%
Normal 1.36 0.99 1.76
DiffAI 0.98 0.92 1.38
PGD 1.22 0.97 1.51
(b) CIFAR10
FGSM/Random
Training Method Mdn 25% 75%
Normal 1.78 1.60 2.02
DiffAI 1.67 1.47 2.03
PGD 1.84 1.65 2.10
Although theoretical debate has ensued as to the merits of this argument [41], the effectiveness
of adversarials generated according to this hypothesis (i.e., using the standard “fast gradient sign
method” or “FGSM”) has sustained it as one of the most well-subscribed-to theories as to the source
of adversarial examples. However, to our knowledge, the fundamental assumption of the theory—that
real images and their adversarial counterparts lie on the same linear region of a neural network—has
not been rigorously validated empirically.
To empirically validate this hypothesis, we considered a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for
the linearity hypothesis to hold. Namely, while the linearity hypothesis predicts that the network is
highly linear when perturbing in any direction from a given input point, we can use EXACTLINE to
consider how linear the network is when perturbing in a single direction. To do this, we looked at the
line between an image and its FGSM-perturbed counterpart (which is classified differently by the
network), then used EXACTLINE to quantify the density of each line (the number of linear partitions
— each delineated by tick marks in Figure 4 — divided by the distance between the endpoints). If the
underlying linearity assumption holds, we would expect that both the real image and the perturbed
image lie on the same linear partition, thus we would not expect to see the line between them pass
through any other linear partitions. In fact (top of Figure 4), we find that the adversarial image seems
to lie across many linear partitions, directly contradicting the fundamental assumption of Goodfellow
et al. [7].
We also compared this line to the line between the real image and the real image randomly perturbed
by the same amount (bottom of Figure 4) in order to have a baseline to understand comparatively
how non-linear this adversarial direction is. As shown in Table 3, the FGSM direction seems to pass
through significantly more linear partitions than a randomly chosen direction. This result shows that,
not only is the linearity assumption not met, but in fact the opposite appears to be true: adversarial
examples are associated with unusuallly non-linear directions of the network.
With these results in mind, we realized that the linearity assumption as initially presented in Good-
fellow et al. [7] is stronger than necessary; it need only be the case that the gradient is reasonably
constant across the line, so that the tangent plane approximation used is still reasonably accurate. To
measure how well the tangent plane approximates the function between normal and adversarial inputs,
we compared the gradient taken at the real image (i.e., used by FGSM) to the gradients at each of the
intermediate linear partitions, finding the mean error between each and averaging weighted by size
of the partition. If this number is near 0, it implies that, although many theoretically distinct linear
partitions exist between the two points, they have roughly the same “slope” and thus the tangent
plane approximation would be accurate and the Linearity Hypothesis may still be a worthwhile
explanation of the phenomenon of adversarial examples. However, we find that this number is larger
than 250% when averaged over all images tested, implying that the tangent plane is not a particularly
good approximation of the underlying function in these regions of input space and providing further
empirical evidence against the Linear Explanation of adversarial examples.
Characteristics of Adversarially-Trained Networks We also noticed an unexpected trend in
the previous experiment: networks trained to be robust to adversarial perturbations (particularly
DiffAI-trained networks [33]) seemed to have significantly fewer linear partitions in all of the lines
that we evaluated them on (see Figure 5). Further experiments, summarized in Table 4, showed that
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Table 4: Taking the same line in the input space (eg. between normal image and adversarially-
perturbed version) on the same network trained three ways (normal, DiffAI, and PGD). For each line,
we then divided the density of linear partitions and report the mean of those ratios here. These results
indicate that networks trained to be adversarially robust with DiffAI or PGD training methods tend to
behave more linearly than non-robust models.
Mdn: Median, 25%: 25% percentile, 75%: 75% percentile.
(a) MNIST
Normal/DiffAI Normal/PGD
Dir. Mdn 25% 75% Mdn 25% 75%
FGSM 3.05 2.05 4.11 0.88 0.66 1.14
Rand. 2.50 1.67 3.00 0.80 0.62 1.00
(b) CIFAR10
Normal/DiffAI Normal/PGD
Dir. Mdn 25% 75% Mdn 25% 75%
FGSM 3.37 2.77 4.94 1.48 1.22 1.67
Rand. 3.43 2.78 4.42 1.51 1.21 1.80
networks trained to be adversarially robust with PGD and especially DiffAI training methods exhibit
up to 5× fewer linear partitions for the same change in input. This observation suggests that the
neighborhoods around points in adversarially-trained networks are “flat” (more linear).
Takeaways Our results falsify the fundamental assumption behind the well-known Linear Explana-
tion for adversarial examples as well as a relaxed version that we consider in its place. We also find
that adversarial training (with DiffAI and PGD) tends to make networks more linear in the regions
around input points.
Future Work EXACTLINE may continue to be used in the future to propose, empirically support,
or falsify theories about adversarially robust networks, as we have demonstrated in this section. We
believe that further investigation into why DiffAI-protected networks tend to be more linear will help
resolve the question (raised in this work) of whether reduced density of linear partitions contributes
to robustness, or increased robustness results in fewer linear partitions (or if there is a third important
variable impacting both).
6 Future Work
Apart from the future work described previously, EXACTLINE itself can be further generalized. For
example, while our algorithm is extremely fast (a number of seconds) on medium- and large-sized
convolutional and feed-forward networks using ReLU non-linearities, it currently takes over an
hour to execute on large ImageNet networks due to the presence of extremely large MaxPool layers.
Scaling the algorithm and implementation (perhaps by using GPUs for verification, modifying the
architecture of the network itself, or involving safe over-approximations) is an exciting focus for future
work. Furthermore, we plan to investigate the use of safe linear over-approximations to commonly
used non-piecewise-linear activation functions (such as tanh) to analyze a wider variety of networks.
Finally, we can generalize EXACTLINE to compute restrictions of networks to higher-dimensional
input regions, which may allow the investigation of even more novel questions.
7 Conclusion
We address the problem of computing a succinct representation of a linear restriction of a neural
network. We presented EXACTLINE, a novel primitive for the analysis of piecewise-linear deep
neural networks. Our algorithm runs in a matter of a few seconds on large convolutional and ReLU
networks, including ACAS Xu, MNIST, and CIFAR10. This allows us to investigate questions about
these networks, both shedding new light and raising new questions about their behavior.
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A Specification of Evaluation Hardware
Although we do not claim particular performance results, we do point out that all EXACTLINE uses
in our experiments took only a matter of seconds on commodity hardware (although in some cases
the experiments themselves took a few minutes, particularly when computing gradients for Section
4).
For reproducibility, all experimental data reported was run on Amazon EC2 c5.metal instances, using
BenchExec [42] to limit to 16 CPU cores and 16 GB of memory. We have also run the results on
commodity hardware, namely an Intel Core i7-7820X CPU at 3.6GHz with 32GB of memory (both
resources shared with others simultaneously), for which the “matter of seconds” characterization
above holds as well.
All experiments were only run on CPU, although we believe computing EXACTLINE on GPUs is an
important direction for future research on significantly larger networks.
B EXACTLINE for Affine Layers
Theorem 1. For any affine function A : X → Y and line segment QR ⊂ X , the following is a
suitable linear partitioning (Definition 1):
P(AQR) = (Q,R)
Proof. By the definition of P(AQR) it suffices to show that {QR} partitions QR and produce an
affine map A′ such that A(x) = A′(x) for every x ∈ QR.
The first fact follows directly, as QR = QR =⇒ QR ⊆ QR and every element of QR belongs to
QR.
For the second requirement, we claim that A′ = A satisfies the desired property, as A is affine and
A(x) = A(x) for all x in general and in particular for all x ∈ QR.
C EXACTLINE for ReLU Layers
Theorem 2. Given a line segment QR in d dimensions and a rectified linear layer ReLU(x) =
(max(x1, 0), . . . ,max(xd, 0)), the following is a suitable linear partitioning (Definition 1):
P(ReLUQR) = sorted (({Q,R} ∪ {Q+ α(R−Q) | α ∈ D}) ∩QR) , (3)
where D = {−Qi/(Ri −Qi) | 1 ≤ i ≤ d}, Vi is the ith component of vector V , and sorted returns
a tuple of the points sorted by distance from Q.
Proof. First, we define the ReLU function like so:
δ1sign(x1) 0 · · · 0
0 δ1sign(x2) · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · δ1sign(xd)


x1
x2
...
xd

where sign(x) returns 1 if x is positive and 0 otherwise while δij is the Kronecker delta.
Now, it becomes clear that, as long as the signs of each xi are constant, the ReLU function is linear.
We note that, over a Euclidean line segmentQR, we can parameterizeQR asQR(α) = Q+α(R−Q).
Considering the ith component, we have a linear relationQRi(α) = Qi+α(Ri−Qi) which changes
sign at most once, when QRi(α) = 0 (because linear functions in R are continuous and monotonic).
Thus, we can solve for the sign change of the ith dimension as:
QRi(α) = 0
=⇒ 0 = Qi + α(Ri −Qi)
=⇒ α = − Qi
Ri −Qi
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As we have restricted the function to 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, at any α within these bounds the sign of some
component changes and the function acts non-linearly. Between any two such αs, however, the signs
of all components are constant, so the ReLU function is perfectly described by a linear map as shown
above. Finally, we can solve for the endpoints corresponding to any such α using the parameterization
QR(α) defined above, resulting in the formula in the theorem.
Q,R are included to meet the partitioning definition, as the sign of some element may not be 0 at the
Q,R endpoints.
D EXACTLINE for MaxPool Layers
As discussed in the paper, although we do not use MaxPool layers in any of our evaluated networks,
we have developed and implemented an algorithm for computing P(MaxPoolQR), which we
present here. In particular, we present P(MaxPoolWindowQR), i.e. the linear restriction for any
given window. P(MaxPoolMN) can be then be computed by separating each window QR from
MN and applying P(MaxPoolWindowQR). Notably, there may be duplicate endpoints (e.g. if
there is overlap in the windows) which can be handled by removing duplicates if desired.
Algorithm 1: P(MaxPoolWindowQR). Binary operations involving both scalars and vectors apply
the operation element-wise to each component of the vector.
Input: QR, the line segment to restrict the MaxPoolWindow function to.
Output: P(MaxPoolWindowQR)
1 P ← [Q] // Begin an (ordered) list of points with one item, Q.
2 α← 0.0 // Ratio along QR of the last endpoint in P.
3 m← argmax(Q) // Maximum component of the last endpoint in P.
4 while m 6= argmax(R) do
5 D ← Q−Qm(Ri−Qi)−(R−Q)
6 A← {(Di, i) | 1 ≤ i ≤ d ∧ α < Di < 1.0}
7 if A = ∅ then break
8 (α,m)← lexmin(A) // Lexicographical minimum of the tuples in A.
9 append(P, Q+ α× (R−Q))
10 append(P, R)
11 return P // Interpret the list P as a tuple and return it.
Proof. MaxPool applies a separate mapping from each input window to each output component, so it
suffices to consider each window separately.
Within a given window, the MaxPool operation returns the value of the maximum component. It is
thus linear while the index of the maximum component remains constant. Now, we parameterize
QR(α) = Q+ α× (R−Q). At each iteration of the loop we solve for the next point at which the
maximum index changes. Assuming the maximum index is m when α = αm, we can solve for the
next ratio αi > αm at which index i will become larger than m like so (again realizing that linear
functions are monotonic):
QRm(αi) = QRi(αi)
=⇒ Qm + αi × (Rm −Qm) = Qi + αi × (Ri −Qi)
=⇒ αi × (Rm −Qm +Qi −Ri) = Qi −Qm
=⇒ αi = Qi −Qm
(Rm −Qm) +Qi −Ri
If αm ≤ αi < 1, then component i becomes larger than component m at QR(αi). We can compute
this for all other indices (producing set A in the algorithm) then find the first index that becomes
larger than m. We assign this index to m and its ratio to α. If no such index exists, we can conclude
that m remains the maximum until R, thus additional endpoints are not needed.
Thus, within any two points in P the maximum component stays the same, so the MaxPool can be
exactly replaced with a linear map returning only that maximum element.
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At worst, then, for each of the w windows each of size s, we may add O(s) new endpoints (QR(α)
is monotonic in each component so the maximum index can only change s times), and for each of
those O(s) new endpoints we must re-compute D, which requires O(s) operations. Thus, the time
complexity for each window is O(s2) and for the entire MaxPool computation is O(ws2).
Although most practical applications (especially on medium-sized networks) do not reach that
worst-case bound, on extremely large (ImageNet-sized) networks we have found that such MaxPool
computations end up taking the majority of the computation time. We believe this is an area for future
work, perhaps using GPUs or other deep-learning hardware to perform the analysis.
E EXACTLINE for MaxPool + ReLU Layers
When a MaxPool layer is followed by a ReLU layer (or vice-versa), the preceding algorithm may
include a large number of unnecessary points (for example, if the maximum index changes but
the actual value remains less than 0, the ReLU layer will ensure that both pieces of the MaxPool
output are mapped to the same constant value 0). To avoid this, the MaxPool algorithm above can be
modified to check before adding each Pi whether the value at the maximum index is below 0 and thus
avoid adding unnecessary points. This can be made slightly more efficient by “skipping” straight to
the first index where the value becomes positive, but overall the worst-case time complexity remains
O(ws2).
F EXACTLINE for General Piecewise-Linear Layers
A more general algorithm can be devised for any piecewise-linear layer, as long as the input space
can be partitioned into finitely-many (possibly unbounded) convex polytopes, where the function
is affine within each one. For example, RELU fits this definition where the convex polytopes are
the orthants. Once this has been established, then, we take the union of the hyperplanes defining
the faces of each convex polytope. In the RELU example, each convex polytope defining the
linear regions corresponds to a single orthant. Each orthant has an “H-representation” in the form
{x | x1 ≤ 0 ∧ x2 > 0 ∧ . . . ∧ xn ≤ 0}, where we say the corresponding “hyperplanes defining
the faces” of this polytope are {{x | x1 = 0}, . . . , {x | xn = 0}} (i.e., replacing the inequalities
in the conjunction with equalities). Finally, given line segment QR, we compare Q and R to each
hyperplane individually; wherever Q and R lie on opposite sides of the hyperplane, we add the
intersection point of the hyperplane with QR. Sorting the resulting points gives us a valid P(f QR)
tuple. If desired, the minimization described in Section 2 can be applied to recover the unique smallest
P(f QR) tuple.
The intuition behind this algorithm is exactly the same as that behind the RELU algorithm; partition
the line such that each resulting segment lies entirely within a single one of the polytopes. The further
intuition here is that, if a point lies on a particular side of all of the faces defining the set of polytopes,
then it must lie entirely within a single one of those polytopes (assuming the polytopes partition the
input space).
Note that this algorithm can also be used to compute EXACTLINE for MAXPOOL layers, however,
in comparison, the algorithm in Appendix D effectively adds two optimizations. First, the “search
space” of possibly-intersected faces at any point is restricted to only the faces of the polytope that the
last-added point resides in (minimizing redundancy and computation needed). Second, we always
add the first (i.e., closest to Q) intersection found, so we do not have to sort the points at the end
(we literally “follow the line”). Such function-specific optimizations tend to be beneficial when the
partitioning of the input space is more complex (eg. MAXPOOL); for component-wise functions like
RELU, the general algorithm presented above is extremely efficient.
G EXACTLINE Over Multiple Layers
Here we prove Theorem 3, which formalizes the intuition that we can solve EXACTLINE for an entire
piecewise-linear network by solving it for all of the intermediate layers individually. Then, we use
EXACTLINE on each layer in sequence, with each layer partitioning the input line segment further so
that EXACTLINE on each latter layer can be computed on each of those partitions.
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Theorem 3. Given any piecewise-linear functions f, g, h such that f = h ◦ g along with a line
segment QR where g(R) 6= g(Q) and P(gQR) = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) is EXACTLINE applied to g
over QR, the following holds:
P(f QR) = sorted
(
n−1⋃
i=1
{
Pi +
y − g(Pi)
g(Pi+1)− g(Pi) × (Pi+1 − Pi) | y ∈ P
(
hg(Pi)g(Pi+1)
)})
where sorted returns a tuple of the points sorted by distance from Q.
Proof. Consider any linear partition of g defined by endpoints (Pi, Pi+1) of QR. By the definition
of P(gQR), there exists some affine map Ai such that g(x) = Ai(x) for any x ∈ PiPi+1.
Now, consider P(hg(Pi)g(Pi+1)) = (Oi1 = Pi, Oi2, . . . , Oim = Pi+1). By the definition of
P(hg(Pi)g(Pi+1)), then, for any partition OijOij+1, there exists some affine map Bij such that
h(x) = Bij(x) for all x ∈ OijOij+1.
Realizing that Oij , O
i
j+1 ∈ g(Pi)g(Pi+1) and that PiPi+1 maps to g(Pi)g(Pi+1) under g (affineness
of g over PiPi+1), and assuming g(Pi) 6= g(Pi+1) (i.e., Ai is non-degenerate), there exist unique
Iij , I
i
j+1 ∈ PiPi+1 such that g(Iij) = Oij and g(Iij+1) = Oij+1. In particular, as affine maps retain
ratios along lines, we have that:
Iij = Pi +
Oij − g(Pi)
g(Pi+1)− g(Pi) × (Pi+1 − Pi)
And similar for Iij+1. (In the degenerate case, we can take I
i
j = Pi, I
i
j+1 = Pi+1 to maintain the
partitioning).
Now, we consider the line segment IijI
i
j+1 ⊆ PiPi+1. As it is a subset of PiPi+1, all points
x ∈ IijIij+1 are transformed to Ai(x) ∈ g(Oij)g(Oij+1) by g. Thus, the application of h to any such
point y = Ai(x) ∈ OijOij+1 is Bij(y), and the composition (Bij ◦ Ai)(x) is an affine map taking
points x ∈ IijIij+1 to f(x).
Finally, as the Ojs partition each g(Pi)g(Pi+1) and each PiPi+1 partitions QR, and we picked Iijs
to partition each PiPi+1, the set of Iijs partitions QR.
This theorem can be applied for each layer in a network, allowing us to identify a linear partitioning
for the entire network with only linear partitioning algorithms for each individual layer.
H Constant Gradients with EXACTLINE
In Section 4, we relied on the fact that the gradients are constant within any linear partition given by
P(RELUQR) computed with Equation 3. This fact was formalized by Theorem 4, which we prove
below:
Theorem 4. For any network f with nonlinearities introduced only by ReLU functions and
P(f QR) = (P1, P2, . . . , Pn) computed according to Equation 3, the gradient of f with respect to
its input vector x, i.e. ∇f(x), is constant within each linear partition PiPi+1.
Proof. We first notice that the gradient of the entire network, when it is well-defined, is determined
completely by the signs of the internal activations (as they control the action of the ReLU function).
Thus, as long as the signs of the internal activations are constant, the gradient will be constant as well.
Equation 4 in our paper identifies partitions where the signs of the internal activations are constant.
Therefore, the gradient in each of those regions PiPi+1 is also constant.
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However, in general, for arbitrary f , it is possible that the action of f may be affine over the line
segment PiPi+1 but not affine (or not describable by a single Ai) when considering points arbitrarily
close to (but not lying on) PiPi+1. In other words, the definition of P
(
f QR
)
as presented in our
paper only requires that the directional derivative in the direction of QR is constant within each
linear partition PiPi+1, not the gradient more generally. A stronger definition of EXACTLINE could
integrate such a requirement, but we present the weaker, more-general definition in the text for clarity
of exposition.
However, as demonstrated in the above theorem, this stronger requirement is met by Equation 3, thus
our exact computation of Integrated Gradients is correct.
I Further EXACTLINE Implementation Details
We implemented our algorithms for computing P(f QR) in C++ using a gRPC server with Protobuf
interface. This server can be called by a fully-fledged Python interface which allows one to define or
import networks from ONNX [43] or ERAN [39] formats and compute P(f QR) for them. For the
ACAS Xu experiments, we converted the ACAS Xu models provided in the ReluPlex [12] repository
to ERAN format for analysis by our tool.
Internally, we represent P(f QR) by a vector of endpoints, each with a ratio along QR (i.e., α for
the parameterization QR(α) = Q+ α× (R−Q)), the layer at which the endpoint was introduced,
and the corresponding post-image after applying f (or however many layers have been applied so
far).
On extremely large (ImageNet-sized) networks, storing the internal network activations corresponding
to each of the thousands of endpoints requires significant memory usage (often hundreds of gigabytes),
so our implementation sub-divides QR when necessary to control memory usage. However, for
all tested networks, our implementation was extremely fast and could compute P(f QR) for all
experiments in seconds.
J Floating Point Computations
As with ReluPlex [12], we make use of floating-point computations in all of our implementations,
meaning there may be some slight inaccuracies in our computations of each Pi. However, where float
inaccuracies in ReluPlex correspond to hard-to-interpret errors relating to pivots of simplex tableaus,
floating point errors in our algorithms are easier to interpret, corresponding to slight miscomputation
in the exact position of each linear partition endpoint Pi. In practice, we have found that these
errors are small and unlikely to cause meaningful issues with the use of EXACTLINE. With that said,
improving accuracy of results while retaining performance is a major area of future work for both
ReluPlex and EXACTLINE.
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